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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20010268-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Appellant Jesus Rosillo was entitled at trial to an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of robbery. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Rosillo was charged with aggra-
vated robbery under an accomplice liability theory. According to the evidence, Rosillo 
and co-defendant Andrew Mallory took personal property from Steven Lund. During the 
robbery, Mallory pulled out an object that Rosillo recognized as a gun. Rosillo testified 
that when he saw the gun, he got scared and wanted to keep Mallory calm; he went 
"along with" the robbery out of panic and fear. 
Under the law, Rosillo may not be responsible for Mallory's conduct. 
He may be responsible for a criminal act only to the degree of his own mental 
state. Evidence supports that Rosillo was not an accomplice to the use of the gun. Thus, 
the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense of robbery. 
The state does not dispute relevant portions of Rosillo's argument on appeal. 
Rather, the state claims that based on its interpretation of the evidence, Rosillo could not 
have been convicted of robbery because he maintained innocence in the matter. The state 
is incorrect. The evidence supports the lesser-offense instruction. Thus, Rosillo 
respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing the judgment and remanding this 
case for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO ROSILLO'S REQUEST FOR THE 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION. THUS, THE STATE'S 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL IS NOT PERSUASIVE. 
In August 2000, the state charged Rosillo with aggravated robbery under an 
accomplice-liability theory. According to the state's evidence, two men identified as 
Rosillo and Mallory approached Steven Lund while he was inside a shuttle van at the 
vacuum stalls for the Ute Car Wash on 300 South and 300 East. When Lund emerged 
from the shuttle van, he turned around and observed Mallory pointing a gun at him. He 
also observed Rosillo standing beside Mallory. (R. 144:13-16.) The men ordered Lund 
to hand over his money and wallet, and after Lund complied, the men took the property 
and walked away. (R. 144:16-19; 145:14-15.) 
Rosillo and Mallory were arrested a short time later, and officers discovered a wad 
of cash on each co-defendant. (See.R. 144:47-50, 62-68.) Police also located a gun and 
a wallet at an apartment that Rosillo and Mallory shared with their families. (See R. 
144:77-80.) A complete statement of the facts is set forth in the opening Brief of 
Appellant. (See Brief of Appellant, dated July 30, 2001 ("Brief of Appellant"), at 3-7.) 
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At trial, Rosillo asked the judge to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense 
of robbery. (R. 78; 145:53.) The judge denied the request. (R. 145:53-54.) Rosillo is 
challenging the trial judge's ruling on the matter in this appeal. 
As set forth in Rosillo's opening Brief of Appellant, to begin the analysis, Utah 
courts have ruled that when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser-included 
offense, the trial court must provide the instruction to the jury if "(i) the statutory 
elements of [the] greater and lesser included offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the 
evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense.1" State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); see State v. Evans. 
2001 UT 22, Tfl8, 20 P.3d 888; State v. Jones. 878 P.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a), (4) (1999) (hereinafter the "Baker" analysis). 
Also, in considering the above factors, the court must view the evidence and 
reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to the defense." State v. Crick. 675 
P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983); State v. Kruger. 2000 UT 60, ^ 14, 6 P.3d 1116. If there is 
"some rational basis" in the evidence on which the jury could consider the lesser offense, 
the instruction must be given. Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424. 
In this case, the state has conceded the first prong of the Baker analysis, and other 
relevant points as discussed below. See infra subpoint A., herein. However, the state 
disputes that a rational basis existed in the evidence to find Rosillo guilty of the lesser 
3 
offense. The state's argument fails to consider the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to Rosillo. When the evidence and inferences are properly considered, they 
compel the determination that Rosillo was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser 
offense of robbery. See infra subpoints B. and C, herein. 
A. THE STATE HAS MADE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS AND 
OBSERVATIONS SUPPORTING THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE. 
The state acknowledges that under the first prong of the Baker analysis, "robbery 
is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery." (State's Brief at 10). "[T]he 
statutory elements of [the] greater and lesser included offenses overlap to some degree." 
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). Also, in the context of this 
case, under the second prong of the Baker analysis, "defendant established a rational basis 
in the evidence upon which the jury could have acquitted him of aggravated robbery." 
(State's Brief at 11.) 
On appeal, the state disputes only the second part of the Baker analysis. That is, 
the state claims the evidence failed to provide a rational basis for convicting Rosillo of 
robbery. The state's claims are insupportable. 
As set forth below, the primary dispute in the evidence concerned co-defendant 
Mallory's use of a dangerous weapon, and whether Rosillo directed, solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or aided in the use of that weapon. (See R. 145:68-70, 71-72.) 
Since jurors were required to resolve disputes and contradictions in the evidence as they 
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related to that primary issue, the jurors should have been given adequate choices and 
instructions under the law on the matter. In that regard, the jury should have been 
instructed on the lesser-included offense of robbery. 
B. THE STATE CLAIMS THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A CONVICTION ON THE LESSER OFFENSE OF ROBBERY. YET. UNDER 
THE STANDARD FOR LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS PROVIDING THE INSTRUCTION TO THE 
JURY. 
The state acknowledges that in reviewing a defendant's request for an instruction 
on a lesser-included offense, this Court will "liberally construe[] the Baker requirements" 
to permit the instruction. (State's Brief at 9.) Also, the evidence and inferences must be 
interpreted in favor of the defendant's request for the instruction. Where the evidence is 
"ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations, the trial court must give the 
lesser included offense instruction if any one of the alternative interpretations provides 
both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense." (State's Brief at 11 (cite omitted).) 
The state recognizes that the standard identified above supports the fundamental 
policy that a jury must be permitted to elect between the appropriate greater and lesser 
offenses that fit the facts, rather than between the first-degree aggravated felony charge 
the prosecutor chose to file, and acquittal. (State's Brief at 9.) 
Notwithstanding the concessions, the state argues that while the evidence pro-
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vided a rational basis for acquitting Rosillo of aggravated robbery, that "same evidence" 
(State's Brief at 12) was insufficient to support a conviction on the lesser offense under 
the second prong of the Baker analysis. That is, according to the state, if evidence served 
to acquit Rosillo of the greater charge, the evidence also "necessarily led to an acquittal 
on the lesser offense." (State's Brief at 12.) In connection with that argument, the state 
has cited to State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984); State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 
527, 533-34 (Utah 1983); Baker, 671 P.2d at 160; State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656, 662-63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); and State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The 
state's argument is unpersuasive and should be rejected for the following reasons. 
(1) The state9s argument is incorrect as a matter of law. In the event this case 
concerned an aggravated robbery where accomplice liability was not alleged, the state's 
argument may be correct: A defendant's claim of innocence necessarily would support 
innocence on all lesser included offenses. For example, if Lund had emerged from 
vacuuming the van to face one suspect, that single suspect's claim at trial that he was not 
involved in the matter necessarily would support an acquittal both on the greater charge 
and the lesser included offense. See Shabata, 678 P.2d at 787, 790 (defendant claimed 
he did not meet with the victim on the day of the murder and he did not murder the 
victim; defendant was precluded from presenting a manslaughter instruction since he 
claimed innocence with respect to the entire act). 
This case does not present that situation. This case concerns accomplice liability. 
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e liability is an element of the crime that must be 
established by the state beyond a reasonable doubi. ^_ State ex reh V. T. 2000 I T App 
189, TJ9, 5 P.3d 1234 ("the State must prove the elements of accomplice liability beyond a 
reasonable doubt *"); State v. Webb, ''Ml I" M f»\ K>1 (1 lull l I App I'WIli iie-uigni/mg 
"LII "I establish ,»yj!np '»Uil "'l»^' n "" M i« i onipln r ^ \h mmi pn»i elements for 
aggravated robbery, § 76-6-302(1), and accomplice liability, § 76-2-202); State v. 
Labrum,959P.2dl20. 12? (Vtali Ct. Apr ' ° ° ^ ' iider accomplice liability statute, the 
state was required to show thai i.wier panic, both iiau me required nici^ai >UIK •<;. .,v 
charged oflensi. IIMI Ih1'' il" ,|ll|,1 \ "",l ' Il1 "I 11",1 MIMMIMH,', m 
commar encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the shooting), cert, denied, 
982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); (R. inv \\n (accomplice liability instructions) -04 
(instruction defining aggravated robbery as a party to the otlense>. i WN * elements 
instruction ior aggravated robbers I,» 
The state dues not dispute that the prosecution was required to prove accomplice 
liability in this case. (See State's Brief atlO.) To that end, to support a conviction, on the 
charged offense, the state was required to establish a robbery, the aggravating circum-
stance, and acuunpluv lulnllfh See \\.cbk 1'NHi I1" "til ml K-l il illlln" enm.lusi mi il I r i il i f 
the scheved Rosillo was guilty of some crime, i.e. robbery, and it also believed that 
Rosillo did not share in Mallory's use of the gun, the e\ idenee would Mipport .m ikUhiltal 
on the greater offense, but not necessarily on an le>ser-mUaaeu offenses. 
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Stated another way, under the law, while an accomplice may be found liable for an 
act, he is not necessarily responsible for the co-defendant's act. State v. Alvarez, 872 
P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994) (recognizing accomplices may have different criminal 
intent in the commission of an offense; some parties may intend assault while other 
parties intend to kill the victims). Utah case law supports that co-defendants to the same 
criminal episode may not necessarily be liable for the same offense. Thus, under 
accomplice liability, if a party maintains his innocence on the greater offense, that does 
not necessarily support an acquittal on all lesser included offenses. 
In Alvarez, the defendant was convicted of intentional first-degree murder where 
two persons were killed during a fight. The defendant's sentence was enhanced under 
the "gang enhancement" statute, which required proof of accomplice liability. Defendant 
argued the gang enhancement statute could not be applied to him because other parties to 
the episode did not intend to kill; they intended to assault. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 452-53, 
461. The Utah Supreme Court relied on the accomplice liability statute and stated, 
"[p]arty liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in the 
criminal conduct have the same mental state." Id. at 461. That is, one party may have 
intent to assault, while another party may have intent to kill. Under accomplice liability, 
each party would be responsible only for his own mental state in the matter. IcL 
In State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, the defendant and co-defendant hog-tied the 
victim in his home, and stole items of personal property. When the house was set on fire, 
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-defendant fled w it'll 101 it 1: lelping the victim. IdL_at 422-23. I he 
evidence was undisputed that personal property was taken from the home, the house was 
set on fire, Hansen was aware of the fire, and the victim died. Id_at 422-23. 
i iunsen was charged w ith intentional aggra\ ated i nurder. J "It trial, I lansei I denied 
iiiiinlliiii' (lie Iliiii'i'cd offeitst lull .it him Inlpnl irspnnsihili1\ lor .1 lesser, i //r>//n> nil 
crime: "His theory was that his intentional conduct only involved tying up Stewart during 
the course of ihc burglary/robben and thai he failuu u *mtie Ste\\art. although the 
cause of Stewart's deatii. was a result oi panic altci discovery of i.ic IL*. oilier than an 
1: lis /, * - ; - ]! > uic iuotxrn birr Ian and not to the victim s Utam. 
The supreme court ruled that defendant Hansen was entitled to 1 lave the jury 
instructed on his theory of felony murder, a lesser-included often*e. i nat offense 
contained an "miei . . . J . - ~,JI:A^. : , e 
- s death.1 
The Hansen case supports that co-defendants maj have different mental states in 
the commission of the same act. The different mental states will support convictions for 
1 'the state claiih.-* I lan^eri- .- .--*- i ._d a, ; „ „3. ^ ^uu^iA^^nc because Hansen "w as 
completely unaware that his accomplice in those offenses had set fire to the house, from 
which he fled/ g a t e ' s Brief at 14.; I hat assertion is incorrect. In Hansen, the 
defendant took the witness stand and testified that "while he was searching the house lor 
property, he became aware that [co-defendant] Rocco [had] set ii >n hk . vA\'w\ led Han-
sen to panic and flee" without helping or untying the victim. Hansen. 734 I\2d at 42223. 
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separate crimes. 
Hansen applies here. In this case, the evidence supports that Lund was the victim 
of a robbery, Rosillo took money from Lund and walked away with it, and Mallory 
pointed a gun at Lund during the robbery. 
The evidence further supports that Rosillo became aware that Mallory had a gun 
after the robbery was commenced, and Rosillo denied participation in the use of the gun. 
That is, Rosillo did not direct Mallory to use the gun, and he did not solicit, request, 
encourage, command, or otherwise aid in the use of the gun. Rosillo's "theory was that 
his intentional conduct only involved" taking the money from Lund and walking away, 
and that his conduct "was a result of panic" after discovering that Mallory had a gun. 
(See R. 145:11-15, 27); see.also.Hansen, 734 P.2d at 423. In accordance with Hansen, 
Rosillo was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery, since that 
supported his intent as it related to the criminal act. See also Crick, 675 P.2d at 534 (co-
defendants may be found responsible for different crimes arising from the same episode). 
(2) The cases cited by the state in support of its argument are irrelevant. In 
connection with the state's argument that the evidence provided a rational basis for ac-
quittal on the greater offense and also "necessarily [supported] an acquittal on the lesser 
offense," the state has cited to Shabata, 678 P.2d 785; Baker, 671 P.2d 152; Cox, 826 
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I' ?,d hSfi, and Sherard, .* v " '' - (State's Brief at 12.)" The state does not analyze 
those cases in its brief l See id, at 11-12 (no discussion of cases cited b} stale)) Irdv-i J, 
those cases are inapposite. 
By way of explanation, in Shabata, (> '8 l\Jd al 'M>> » ml'" dek'iid.inl \. -i1 
uiarncd ' iiiiii niiiiin m i in nlm i prison n,i i haruecl as an <u i nmpluv ind defendant 
denied all involvement in the matter. At trial, defendant requested a lesser-included 
offense instruct, jn for mans laughter on the basK \]\J lh« \ k 'i *;v !cafl may have been 
caused "in the heat of passion " Tel at '"•>•. ..* ..„,i enun tuia^x ai*. .cqucsi, A . 
Utah Supreme <
 t , . . . , . . 
'n fir rfltvl ( ' .-•! nhe VKanii'&J death caid thai he had never injured or 
even argued \\ ilk i~i~. ^L_ . . . . c\ idente offered the jury only the choice hetu cen 
finding defendant innocent or guilty of the crime charged." IdL "Defendant claimed that 
he did not cominit the act" and lir* "(hems ul ddeua: pnrhided ihe n'qiie^ted in^nn i »n 
on liiansIaiighU/i Id Shabala is distinguishable from this case. Shabata does not 
2 The state also has cited to Crick, 675 P.2d at 534. (State's Brief at 12.) That case 
stands for the proposition that "[a] defendant can be criminally responsible for an act 
committed by another, but the degree of his responsibility is determined by his own 
mental state in the acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state of 
the actor." Id (emphasis added); see also Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461. In Crick, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that co-defendants may not necessarily be guilty of the same 
offense although they participated in the same criminal episode. For example, one co-
defendant may be guilty of murder while the other may be guilty of manslaughter in :ne 
same act. As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, that cast supports Rosillo's 
argument for the lesser-included oilense instruction. (See Brief of Appellant .n !- 'l} ) 
1 1 
concern defendant's request for a lesser-included offense instruction under an 
accomplice liability theory. 
Next, the state relies on Baker, 671 P.2d at 152. In that case, defendant was found 
in a storage closet of a locked building and was charged with burglary. Defendant argued 
at trial that he was too intoxicated to form intent; and he asked the trial court to instruct 
the jury on the offense of intentional criminal trespass. Id_at 159-60. The trial court re-
fused, and the supreme court affirmed, on the basis that defendant's evidence of intoxi-
cation was meant to negate specific intent, not to prove the existence of intent for criminal 
trespass. (See Brief of Appellant, at 28-31, and discussion of Baker therein.) Again, the 
case cited by the state is distinguishable since it does not concern accomplice liability. 
With respect to Cox, 826 P.2d at 656, the defendant there was charged with 
burglary and theft of a cabin in the mountains. Defendant testified that he was not at the 
cabin, id at 658, and he claimed he "never entered the cabin." Id.at 663. Nevertheless, 
he requested an instruction on the lesser offense of criminal trespass for "entering] or 
remaining] unlawfully" on the property. LdL_at n. 2. This Court ruled there was no 
"substantial evidence to support a trespass theory." IcL_at 662-63. Since the defendant in 
Cox claimed he was not in the vicinity of the crime, it is distinguishable from this matter. 
In Sherard, 818 P.2d at 554, defendant was convicted of murder. She requested an 
instruction on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. This Court recognized 
that the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of manslaughter, but had rejected 
12 
llilihil i l l r m . i l i M 1 III f ind d e f e n d a n t gui l t" •  l • \.roc\ J : .1 Court ruled that 
defendant's request for an instruction on negligcni lumicide was insupportable. "[S]ince 
the jury convicted of second degree murder despite the fact that an instruction was given 
on the lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure to give a n e g u ^ . . . :..:,; 
I '.2d 254 ,267 (Utah 1988)). 
The cases set forth above and identified by the state do not constitute controlling 
authority on the issue before this Coi in: t They are not helpful to the analysis ^ ^ U > J T ' 9 J 1 
, i j iuumuier 's Daughter ; 85 1 2 1 1 C 8 ; , 1 : < >C 
; . :' does not address the issue before the court, the case cannot constitute controlling 
_ a x ; . i ) on the matter); see State V. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,1J6 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (state relies 
on case law that is not dispositive of the issue before the court). On that basis, the state's 
argument sh :>i il ;:i 1: e i ejected. 
I Ite state3s ii}\ imi i il» fwuld be rejectee •-*/ the basis inai me evidence here 
supports both an acquittal on the greater offense ami a conviction on the lesser 
offense. The facts and inferences viewed in the light most favorable to Rosillo5 s request 
foi the i obbei > instn ictioi I satisfy 1:1 le secoi I :1 pi oi lg :)f tl: le Baker ai i,ajy sis. 
The evidence at trial reflected the following: Rosillo testified that he went "aionu 
with" the matter to keep Mallory and. the situation calm; Rosillo acted out of panic aiu 
fear when he took I -und's money and wallet; and Rosillo walked away nnh L u u d \ 
property. (See R. 145:11-15, 27.) 
Rosillo denied any involvement with the gun. In fact, he testified he did not rea-
lize Mallory had a gun until after they were involved in the robbery. (R. 145:11-17, 27.) 
According to the state, "defendant's testimony went only to his innocence on both 
the charged offense of aggravated robbery and simple robbery. In sum, because 
defendant's entire testimony and any evidence adduced on appeal [sic] was that 
defendant played no part in any robbery, there was no rational basis in the evidence for 
the requested lesser offense instruction." (State's Brief at 15.) The state's argument 
disregards the facts and it ignores the applicable standard for lesser-included offense 
instructions. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59; Crick, 675 P.2d at 532 (evidence and 
inferences must be interpreted in favor of the request for the lesser-included offense 
instruction). 
In addition, the state's argument is contrary to the evidence adduced and argument 
made by the prosecutor at trial. During Rosillo's cross-examination, the prosecutor 
pointed out that when Lund turned over the money and wallet, Rosillo did not protest. 
He did not say, "I don't want the money, I don't want to have nothing [sic] to do with 
this," and he did not "drop the [items] and say, oh, that's not, that's not my money." (R. 
145:31.) At trial, the prosecutor argued the following: 
Even Mr. Rosillo admitted that he intended to take [the money]. He held his hand 
out, he took the money. It was his intent to take it. Maybe he was trying to 
diffuse the situation, as he claims, maybe he was trying to be calm, but he took the 
money intentionally. Remember, I asked him, ["]well, did you drop it, did you say 
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...,'ii i v\iu.. ..: i\ii- * a,i;- -:::;ig to do with i t . , . that's robber)' money?[" "]1 Jo, 
i LUUK it.["] That's intentional '! hai what the elements of the crime require. By 
his own comments he admits ^ 
(R. 14 "vol \ TIK- state's argument at trial supports the robbery instruction. Rosillo was 
instructed on the lesser-included offense. 
In anil U '.ill i ti/slifinl fun hunted p iilieipiitioiii in ilk imbbt n iiiill nil paniu iiiiiill 
fear. (See R. 145:15.) In addition, there was no direct evidence that Rosillo solicited, 
i • = qi lested, commanded, directed, or otherwise aided in the u-e of Ihe weapon. Viewed in 
the light most fi- u.imL io UK attendant a ratio*.a MM> existed for an acquittal on the 
greatei offense i . . . . . . . . . 
'.hoiihl luive been allowed to decide whether the evidence supported Rosillo's 
participation as an accomplice to aggravated robbery; or whether it supported his limited 
participation in robbery out of panic and fear.3 For the reasons more tuli\ set l-\ w < a he 
3 Additional c\ ^ .acitiiiivw v>\ a,w .>;au adj., i.^aa,.. .UJ\MS. ^ee ^ ri,,»\. 
P.2d at 533 (cow.:. - _iuses to detail evidence supporting , - since that is not in 
issue). For example, the state points to evidence thai Rosillo later Handed the IIMIICV ,I id 
wallet to Mallon .' Stale's Brief at 13.) That is undisputed and irrelevant. -Ms. >. th Jt 
evidence shows \ lahon \ menial siate. It does notningto suggest Rosillo intendeu i»r 
assisted in the use oi ihe iiim Juring the encounter v »f- ' and 
Also, the state points to evidence that "defendant told Oliver Carter that he did 
not participate in the robbery." (kJL) That evidence onh supports that Carter's testimony 
was in conflict with Rosillo's testimony, requiring the jur\ to resolve the matter. (See R 
145:82 (prosecutor points out that testimony from Carter raises a conflict that musi oe 
resolved by the jury).) The conflicts in evidence support that jurors should have been 
given all appropriate choices to assist them in resolving factual issues at trial. 
In addition, the state cites to e\ ems mat occurred after the robbery, including the 
arrest and the search of the apartment i hose facts are not in dispute and they add 
nothing to the analysis. That evidence supports that Rosillo may be guilty of "some 
opening Brief of Appellant, this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
C. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING HARMLESSNESS FAILS TO 
RECOGNIZE THAT WHEN THE JURY IS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE 
CONFLICTS IN THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO A PIVOTAL ISSUE. THE 
TRIAL COURT MUST PROVIDE THE LESSER OFFENSE INSTRUCTION 
TO ENSURE THAT MATTERS ARE RESOLVED WITH THE 
APPROPRIATE CHOICES. 
In considering prejudice in the context of the lesser-included offense analysis, a 
reviewing court will not weigh the evidence or assess whether such evidence is sufficient 
to support the conviction as charged. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159 (the reviewing court is not 
allowed to "weigh the credibility of the evidence," since that function is reserved for the 
trier of fact with the appropriate lesser/greater offenses to choose from); State v. 
Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). Rather, the analysis for lesser-included-
offense instructions considers whether there is a "sufficient quantum of evidence to raise 
a jury question regarding [the] lesser offense." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
That standard serves the purpose of allowing the jury to perform its functions with 
all the proper choices. "Society has a legitimate interest in the jury's freedom to act 
according to the evidence." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (citing People v. Chamblis, 236 
N.W.2d 473, 482 (Mich. 1975)). "Where the defendant requests an instruction of a 
lesser included or a related offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence 
offense." Thus, the jury should have been given the appropriate choices in the matter. 
See Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (facts must be viewed in light most favorable to the request 
for the lesser-included offense instruction). 
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on which the jury could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given." 
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. "The rule of Baker is not a mere technical rule designed to trip 
up judges and prosecutors. It serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a 
defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between 
the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." IdL Also, "[w]here one of 
the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt but the defendant is plainly guilty 
of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction." In that 
instance, it is even more important to ensure that the jury is given proper, alternative 
choices in the matter. Id. at 424-25. 
Rosillo has argued that this Court should consider "harmlessness" only if the 
evidence on the lesser offense "is so slight" that reasonable minds necessarily must 
conclude against the defendant on the matter. That harmlessness analysis is consistent 
with Utah case law. See State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998) 
(considering whether the evidence was "so slight" that failure to provide lesser-included 
offense instruction was harmless); State v. Evans. 2001 UT 22, 1HJ21-22, 20 P.3d 888; 
(see Brief of Appellant at 24-27, and discussion concerning Evans).4 
4 The state argues that under the prejudice analysis, this Court will consider whether 
"the alleged error creates a sufficient likelihood of a different outcome so as to 
undermine the reviewing court's confidence in the verdict." (State's Brief at 18-19.) To 
the extent the state advocates a prejudice prong that requires the defendant to 
demonstrate more than a "quantum of evidence" to raise a jury question regarding the 
lesser offense, the state's argument is contrary to Utah law. See. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
Also, in connection with its claim that the error was "harmless," the state cites to 
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In this matter, the state claims, "Any error in refusing the requested instruction on 
robbery was harmless in light of the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt for 
aggravated robbery." (State's Brief at 16.) In support of that claim, the state relies on its 
interpretation of the evidence for the "aggravated robbery" conviction. That 
interpretation is irrelevant. See Crick, 675 P.2d at 532, 533 (evidence must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the request for the lesser-included offense instruction; court 
refuses to detail evidence supporting conviction since that is not in issue); Mitchell, 779 
P.2d at 1122 ("sufficiency" standard is inapplicable to prejudice analysis); see also supra, 
note 4, herein. Indeed, evidence identified by the state may be categorized in two 
respects, both of which support the determination that Rosillo was entitled to an 
instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery. 
First, the state cites to undisputed evidence, including the following: Lund did not 
see Mallory and Rosillo approach him from behind. When Lund turned around, he 
observed Mallory and Rosillo standing in front of him, with Mallory pointing a weapon at 
his chest. (State's Brief at 19.) Rosillo took money and a wallet from Lund, then he and 
Mallory walked away. Rosillo and Mallory were later apprehended. (See State's Brief at 
evidence supporting the verdict on the greater offense. (State's Brief at 16-21.) The 
state essentially is relying on a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" standard for the prejudice 
prong. That is an incorrect standard as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court 
specifically has ruled that the "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis "is not the standard 
by which harmless error determinations are to be made." Mitchell 779 P.2d at 1122. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, when a court considers prejudice and harm, "it is 
irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support the verdict." IcL_ 
18 
19.) Officers found a "wad" of cash on both Mallory and Rosillo and they found a gun 
and wallet at the apartment that Rosillo and Mallory shared with their families. (See 
State's Brief at 19-20.) The evidence also supports that Rosillo went "along with" the 
matter out of panic and fear; he believed he did not "have any choice" and he wanted to 
keep Mallory calm. ( See id. at 5-7.) Under the Baker standard, the evidence was 
sufficient to support an acquittal for Rosillo on the greater offense of aggravated robbery, 
and a conviction on the lesser offense of robbery. See supra subpoint B, herein. Thus, 
Rosillo was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser-included offense. 
Second, the state cites to evidence in conflict and susceptible to alternative inter-
pretations. According to the state, "Defendant said to Lund, 'Give me your money'" and 
he requested Lund's wallet. Also, Rosillo played an "active role in the aggravated rob-
bery" by twice making demands of Lund for his money and wallet. (State's Brief at 19.) 
Those facts are in conflict with other facts. Specifically, other evidence supported 
that Rosillo did not demand Lund's money and wallet. Rather, "Mallory demanded 
money from the victim, and although [Rosillo] did not say anything at that point, the 
victim handed [] his wallet and a 'wad' of money [to Rosillo]." (State's Brief at 5.) The 
record supports that Lund's statements and Rosillo's statements about the matter were 
inconsistent, presenting an issue of fact for the jury. Thus, the evidence viewed in the 
light most favorable to the request for the instruction on robbery supports that the jury 
should have been allowed to resolve the conflicts with all appropriate choices, including 
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an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
Finally, contrary to the state's assertions, Rosillo's testimony does not "belie" his 
credibility. (State's Brief at 20.) Indeed, his admissions about the robbery bolster his 
credibility in the matter. Since Rosillo's credibility was an issue for the jury to resolve, 
the jury should have been allowed to assess credibility with the appropriate lesser and 
greater offense instructions. See State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(court is more likely to find prejudice when defendant's credibility is in issue); State v. 
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 
1986) (when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, court 
is less likely to find harmless error). 
This Court will not make credibility determinations in assessing the issue on 
appeal in this case. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. It simply will decide whether there was a 
sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a question for the jury on the lesser-included 
offense. Id The evidence here was sufficient. This Court should find that the refusal to 
give the lesser-included offense instruction was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Rosillo respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing this case for a new trial 
where Rosillo may present an instruction to the jury on the lesser offense of robbery. 
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